Not enough tankers could be made available to handle the requirements of shuttle bombing by large forces. SAC, as single manager for tankers, felt the strain. Twice a day, 27 of its big Boeing KC-135A tankers off-loaded fuel to fighters and other elements of the strike forces. More tankers were dispatched to support the B-52 missions in the theater. Both of those tasks were only contingency missions for SAC, because the primary role of the tanker fleet was in support of the worldwide deployment of SAC bombers and their continuing training missions that extended thousands of miles and demanded several refuelings on route. The bulk of the SAC tankers were orbiting in trackless skies waiting for a B-52 or an FB-111 to nuzzle up for a drink.

Consequently, the availability of tanker support was a limiting factor on the size of the tactical fighter deployments and missions. It was depressing to fighter pilots, who wanted little more than to fly sweeps to force the enemy to come up and tangle. Instead, they had to load bombs on their planes and become flying artillery. It demanded a different mental set, and it was not what fighter pilots had joined the USAF to do.